## Aff Answers

### 2AC --- DCAs – L2NB

#### DCAs strengthen NATO – allow NATO members to signal alignment

**Kinne ‘18** – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/S0020818318000218a.pdf/defense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-security-network.pdf> )//RG

Fourth, traditional military alliances exercise influence in a variety of ways. Allied countries are better equipped to meet one another’s modernization needs, more likely to face common threats, and more likely to share foreign-policy goals. Thus, alliances should generally increase demand for DCAs. However, I anticipate a unique influence for NATO because its unusually broad mandate spills into issue areas—training, defense research, joint exercises, etc.—also addressed by DCAs. Accordingly, demand for DCAs should be lower between NATO states. At the same time, because **DCAs are an important mechanism for prospective NATO members to signal alignment**, I anticipate a positive effect for pairings between NATO members and Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) states.

### 2AC --- DCAs Fail

#### DCAs fail

#### 1 – variation and uncertainty doom proceedings – Singapore and Indonesia prove

**Kinne ‘18** – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/S0020818318000218a.pdf/defense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-security-network.pdf> )//RG

Coordination problems are also apparent in DCAs. Variations in the institutional characteristics of DCAs partially reflect distributional concerns. Governments worry about asymmetric gains—that is, the possibility that one’s partners will gain more than oneself.47 Further, negotiators know that revealing a preference for particular design features may lead others to increase their demands accordingly. Given these incentives, governments anticipate that their interlocutors may not be fully transparent about their treaty preferences. **That uncertainty,** in turn, **increases the risk of bargaining failure.** Given their broad flexibility as framework agreements, DCAs particularly raise concerns about **scope, precision, and the degree of reliance** on implementing arrangements.

A contentious 2007 negotiation between Singapore and Indonesia offers an illuminating example. In response to Singapore’s request for access to Indonesian waters for training purposes, the resulting DCA included a seemingly benign implementing arrangement that designated an “Area Bravo” southwest of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.48 Almost immediately upon signature of the DCA, Indonesian politicians accused Singapore of disingenuousness and began speculating on the “broad latitude” that the Singapore military would wield in Area Bravo, involving naval exercises, air support, live fire, and even participation of third parties—all of which, given Singapore’s growing military strength, would likely intensify over time.49 Indonesia’s defense minister, seizing on ambiguities within the agreement, declared that “Singapore still wants rules of their own, without having to negotiate ... on their military training here.”50 He further asserted, “We want clear rules of the game on the frequency and scope of Singapore military training, including how many times Singapore can fire its missiles in our territory.”51 While Singapore’s true preferences remain opaque, **the mere perception of duplicity by the Indonesian government was sufficient to doom the proceedings.**

#### 2 – mistrust and obligational concerns

**Kinne ‘18** – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/S0020818318000218a.pdf/defense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-security-network.pdf> )//RG

DCAs show strong evidence of **collaboration problems**. When governments coordinate their defense policies, pool defense-related research-and-development (R&D) resources, transfer sophisticated weapons and military technologies, exchange classified information, hold joint exercises, and so on, they engage in inherently risky activities that **create opportunities for exploitation.** The key danger in signing a DCA with an untrusted partner is that **the partner might** ultimately **employ the gains of cooperation for its own strategic advantage**. In the event of direct confrontation, the improvements in military capacity that DCAs enable—better training, access to classified material, first-hand knowledge of others’ tactics and operating procedures—can be readily used to exploit a nominal defense partner. These concerns further extend to relations with third parties, both governmental and nongovernmental. For example, the US has long worried that military cooperation with countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan indirectly supports extremist organizations. More benignly, DCA partnerships also involve **managerial concerns** about the ability of partners to fulfill their obligations.40 In 2007, for example, the Japanese self- defense force unintentionally leaked classified details of the US-built Aegis weapons system, causing a furor in the US defense community.41 For all these reasons, DCAs require credible assurances of trustworthiness.

### 2AC --- Unilat Fails

#### US unilat foreign policy fails – makes us unable to tackle common challenges or succeed domestically

**Haass ‘21** - President of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The World: A Brief Introduction (Richard, Foreign Affairs, “The Age of America First”, December 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-09-29/biden-trump-age-america-first> )//RG

Whatever the failings of this new paradigm, there is no going back; history does not offer do-overs. Nor should Washington return to a foreign policy that, for much of three decades, largely failed both in what it did and in what it did not do.

The starting point for a new internationalism should be a clear recognition that although foreign policy begins at home, it cannot end there. The United States, regardless of its diminished influence and deep domestic divisions, faces a world with both traditional geopolitical threats and new challenges tied to globalization. An American president must seek to fix what ails the United States without neglecting what happens abroad. Greater disarray in the world will make the task to “build back better”—or whatever slogan is chosen for domestic renewal—much more difficult, if not impossible. Biden has acknowledged the “fundamental truth of the 21st century . . . that **our own success is bound up with others succeeding as wel**l”; the question is whether he can craft and carry out a foreign policy that reflects it.

**The U**nited **S**tates also **cannot succeed alone. It must work with others**, through both formal and informal means, **to set international norms and standards and marshal collective action**. Such an approach will require the involvement of traditional allies in Europe and Asia, new partners, countries that may need U.S. or international help at home, and nondemocracies. It will require the use of all the instruments of power available to the United States—diplomacy, but also trade, aid, **intelligence, and the military**. Nor can the United States risk letting unpredictability give it a reputation as unreliable; other states will determine their own actions, especially when it comes to balancing or accommodating China, based in no small part on how dependable and active they believe the United States will be as a partner.

**In the absence of** a new **American internationalism, the** likely **outcome will be a world that is less free, more violent, and less willing** or able **to tackle common challenges**. It is equal parts ironic and dangerous that at a time when the United States is more affected by global developments than ever before, it is less willing to carry out a foreign policy that attempts to shape them.

### 2AC --- Perm Do CP

#### The strategic concept refers to ‘NATO’ as the MEMBERS of the alliance

Sula et al ‘13

(Ismail Erkam Sula \*\* PhD Candidate, Bilkent University, Department of International Relations;, and Cagla Luleci“Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice: The Evolution of NATO’s Security Agenda,” pg online @ <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/19311> //um-ef)

The Strategic Concept is also clear with regard to the referent object of security. In the broadest sense, NATO refers to the security of the ‘alliance’ constituted of North America and Europe (NATO 1991, Article 16). However, throughout the whole Strategic Concept NATO makes clear that its security conception refers to the member states of the alliance. In particular NATO refers “to security amongst the members of the alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other” 46. NATO refers to ‘collective security’ as a broad framework that is constituted of member states. In terms of both agency and referent object the security conception of NATO remains both statist and state-centric. With regard to the policy to